Washington International Law Journal
Volume 5

Number 3

7-1-1996

Eastern Twists on Western Concepts: Equality Jurisprudence and
Sexual Harassment in Japan
Leon Wolff

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons

Recommended Citation
Leon Wolff, Eastern Twists on Western Concepts: Equality Jurisprudence and Sexual Harassment in
Japan, 5 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 509 (1996).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol5/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Copyright 0 1996 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Association

EASTERN TWISTS ON WESTERN CONCEPTS:
EQUALITY JURISPRUDENCE AND SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN JAPAN
Leon Wolff
Abstract: A rich source of Japanese jurisprudence on sexual equality underlies
Japan's emerging law against sexual harassment. With no law specifically outlawing
sexual harassment, academics and the courts have invoked the principle of sexual
equality to support their conclusion that Japanese law carries an implicit prohibition
against acts of sexual harassment. In developing a legal case against sexual harassment,
Japanese courts and academic commentators have introduced novel constructions of
equality.
The key innovations include relational equality, inherent equality and
quantifiable equality. In presenting some of these Japanese contributions to equality
jurisprudence, the hope is that feminist discourse on equality can take place in a broader
context-a context that does not ignore the Eastern cultural experience.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

Sexual HarassmentandSexual Equality in Japan

The emerging Japanese law I against sexual harassment has reignited 2 discussion in Japan on the essence of sexual equality. The renewed
B.A., B.A. (Hons), M.A.J.I.T., LL.B. (Hons) (University of Queensland); LL.M (University of
Washington). All translations, including translations of Japanese titles of journal articles, are my own. A
shorter version of this paper was presented at the Student Law and Society Conference, University of
British Columbia, March 1, 1996. 1 would like to thank Christine Parker, PhD candidate at the Australian
National University, Karen Shulz, guest lecturer in feminist jurisprudence at the University of Queensland,
and Professor Lisa Phillips, visiting Professor of Law at the University of British Columbia, for their
instructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
The first judicial statement on sexual harassment was by
Judge Akimoto of the Shizuoka District
Court. Since the defendant in that case did not enter a defense, the judge issued a default judgment
upholding the plaintiff's claims. Judgment of Dec. 20, 1990, Shizuoka District Court, 745 HANREI
TAiMuzu 238, 580 ROD6 HANREI 17 (1991) [hereinafter Shizuoka Sexual Harassment Case]. The second
sexual harassment case-but the first contested case-was decided by the Fukuoka District Court.
Judgment of Apr. 16, 1992, Fukuoka District Court, 783 HANREI TAIMUZU 60, 607 HANREI JIHo 49, 607
ROD HANREI 6 (1992) [hereinafter Fukuoka Sexual Harassment Case]. The Osaka Sexual Harassment
Case is the latest published decision on sexual harassment as of this writing. Judgment of Aug. 29, 1995,
Osaka District Court, 893 HANREI TAIMUZU 203 (1996) [hereinafter Osaka Sexual HarassmentCase].
2 Notions
of sexual equality have already been explored in a long line
of sex discrimination cases
commencing in the 196Cs. For an overview of these cases, see Catherine W. Brown, JapaneseApproaches
to Equal Rights for Women: The Legal Framework; 12 LAW IN JAPAN 29 (1979); FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 124-65 (1987).
Paradoxically, the passage of the Equal
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attention to sexual equality stems in large part from the fact that Japan does

not have an enactment outlawing sexual harassment. With no specific
statute or code provision explicitly prohibiting acts of sexual harassment,
academics 3 and the courts 4 have been forced to invoke the principle of
sexual equality-a constitutionally enshrined mandate 5 as well as a general
standard permeating the entire fabric of the Japanese legal system. They
conclude that sexual harassment, as a form of sex discrimination, is in
violation of Japanese law. Importantly, Japanese scholars and judges have
engaged equality discourse to determine the content and scope of the

principle of sexual equality and, from that, ascertain whether or not sexual
Employment Opportunity Act, Law No. 113 of June 16, 1972, which came into force on April 1, 1986, has
slowed down the number of cases brought to the courts, mostly because the Act does not provide for
legally enforceable rights. Masako Kamiya, A Decade of the EqualEmployment OpportunityAct in Japan:
Has It Changed Society?, 25 LAW IN JAPAN 40, 60 (1995).
3 The academic scholarship on sexual harassment
has greater significance than merely presenting
possible legal interpretations of a new social problem: in Japan, academic theories often can have a
significant influence in shaping the development of the law, arguably more so than in the United States or
Australia. See HIDEO TANAKA, JI'rTEIHOGAKU NYOMON [INTRODUcTON TO POSITIVE LAW] 188 (1966).
The academics writing on sexual harassment come from diverse backgrounds. They include law
professors (e.g., Hiroko Hayashi is a professor at Fukuoka University), law lecturers (e.g., Satoru Aono is a
lecturer at Meiji University), bureaucrats (e.g., Masaomi Kaneko works for the Tokyo Labor and
Economics Bureau), and feminist lawyers (e.g., Mizuho Fukushima). See Hiroko Hayashi, Shokuba ni
okeru sekushuaru harasumento e no h6teki tai6 [The Legal Response to Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace], 956 JuRisuTo 42 (1990); Hiroko Hayashi, Sekushuaru harasumento to songai baishd seiky
[Sexual Harassmet and a Civil Damages Suit], 1291 RODO HORITSu JUNPO 16 (1992); Satoru Aono,
Sekushuaru harasumento no fuhd k6i sekinin-Fukuoka Sekushuaru Harasumento Jiken (Heisei 4.4.16
Fukuoka Chihan) [Liabilityfor Unlawful Acts of Sexual Harassment-the Fukuoka Sexual Harassment
Case (Judgment of the Fukuoka District Court, April 16, 1992)], 166 KIKAN RCDOHO 198 (1993);
Masaomi Kaneko, Sekashuaru harasumento to wa nanika [What is Sexual Harassment?], 1228 RODO
H6Rrrsu JuNPO, 4 (1989); Masaomi Kaneko et al., Sekushuaru harasumento no h6ritsu mondai [Sexual
Harassment as a Legal Issue], 956 JUIUSUTO 12 (1990); Mizuho Fukushima, Sekushuaru harasumentoto
h6 [Sexual Harassmentand the Law], 1228 R6DO H6RITSU JUNPO 16 (1989). For a profile on Fukushina,
see Louise do Rosario, Mizuho Fukushima: Petite Lady Lawyer Fights Sex Harassment, FAR E. ECON.
REv., Aug. 12, 1993, at 86.
4 At the time of writing, there have been four published
decisions in which the courts have upheld,
either in whole or in part, the plaintiff's claims for relief on the basis of sexual harassment: the Shizuoka
Sexual Harassment Case,supra note I, the Fukuoka Sexual HarassmentCase, supra note 1, the Kanazawa
Sexual Harassment Case, Judgment of 26 May, 1994, Kanzawa District Court, 650 RODO HANREI 8
(1994), and the Osaka Sexual HarassmentCase, supra note 1. Two courts, however, have ruled against
the plaintiffs: the Tokyo Sexual HarassmentCase, Judgment of Apr. 1I, 1994, T6ky6 District Court, 655
RODO HANREI, 44 (1994), and the Yokohama Sexual Harassment Case, Judgment of May 24, 1995,
Yokohama District Court, 670 ROD6 HANREI, 20 (1995).
5 KEMPO
§ 14.
6 Fukuoka Sexual Harassment Case, 1426 HANREI
JIHO 49, 65 (1992). See also Leon Wolff, The
Fukuoka Sexual HarassmentCase--A Japanese Mabo? A JurisprudentialAnalysis ofJudicialFunction in
Japan, 1994 AUSTRALASIAN L. STUDENTS' ASS'N ACAD. J. 71, 77-79.
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harassment violates this principle. It is from this part of their reasoning that
a fountain of different constructs of equality as a justificatory principle
forbidding acts of sexual harassment have evolved.
This article will argue that these Japanese constructions of sexual

equality represent an important contribution to the wider scholarship on
equality jurisprudence. Part II of this article first places this Japanese
jurisprudence on sexual equality in context by briefly overviewing existing
Western feminist theories on sexual equality. This overview will serve as a

backdrop against which the Japanese contributions can be judged. This part
highlights three key Western feminist approaches to equality-the genderblind, the gender-kind8 and the power-reassign9 approaches. Part III shifts

attention eastward to Japan. This part explores the recent development of a
judge-made1 ° law against sexual harassment in Japan and how this has
spurred a re-invigorated Japanese interest in theories on sexual equality.
Part II shows that a rich source of Japanese jurisprudence on sexual equality
lies embedded" in the Japanese scholarly articles and judicial opinions on
sexual harassment; scholars both in the West 12 and in Japan'
tap this source.

3

have yet to

7
My own term. See discussion infra Part II.
8
My own term. See discussion infra Part II.
9
My own term. See discussion infra Part II.
10 It is commonly
assumed that the Japanese judiciary is a "paragon of restraint." Daniel H.
Foote,
JudicialCreation ofNorms in JapaneseLabor Law: Activism in the Service of-Stability?, 43 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 635, 636 (1996). There is now an emerging view that Japanese courts play an important role in
creating new norms. See id at 637 n.4. I have argued, however, that it is misleading to view judicial
function as an 'either or' choice between activism (judges make the law) and passivity (judges follow the
law). Rather, there is a hybrid model of law in which judges develop law-by exploring the whole context
of the legal system to derive principles which would justify new concrete rights and duties. It is submitted
that Japanese judge-made law, at least so far as sexual harassment is concerned, tends to fit within this
model.11Wolff, supranote 6.
In exploring the legal dimensions of sexual harassment, judges and academics have engaged
equality discourse as a tool for their analyses. Equality, however, has never formed a discrete topic of
study. Accordingly, the Japanese models of equality described in this article are implicated, rather than
in the academic literature and judicial decisions.
specifically
12 Forstated,
instance, Patterson, in her casenote on the Fukuoka Sexual HarassmentCase, does not explore
how the court viewed the essence of sexual equality in reaching its decision. Nancy Patterson, No More
Naki-Neiri? The State ofJapaneseSexual Harassment Law: Judgment of April 16, 1992, Fukuoka Chih
Saibansho, Heisei Gannen (1989) (wa) No. 1872, Songai Baish6 Jiken (Japan),34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 206
(19937.
Except for some Japanese feminist scholars, few academics
have attempted to state-explicitly, at
any rate-their vision of sexual equality. See also discussion supra note 11. For a feminist work which
more directly confronts the issue of sexual equality in light of the growing consciousness in Japan of the
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Part IV focuses on some of the Japanese constructions of sexual
equality that have emerged from the recent academic attention to, and
judicial opinions on, sexual harassment. These Japanese models contain

varying shades of similarity and contrasts with existing Western notions.
The value of the Japanese models lies in how the similar models' 4 have

found different expression in the Japanese context and how the dissimilar
models 15 transport equality jurisprudence into completely new territory.
Specifically, Part IV outlines three core Japanese conceptions. The first
16
Japanese theory of sexual equality is that equality is a relationalconcept.

This model posits that equality is determined whether or not men and
women are treated in exactly the same way. The second approach views
equality from a contrary perspective, maintaining that equality is not
relational but rather inherent.
This exposition of equality holds that
women are only equal if they are free to express their intrinsic

"personhood"-including their femaleness-without limitation or threat of

disadvantage. The third view is that equality is a quantifiable18 notion-a"

model that further subdivides into different strands depending on whether
power, economic utiles, or decency and good manners is regarded as the
appropriate measurement of equality. It is these different Japanese models
of equality which, while clearly relevant to Japanese black letter

discrimination law, have deeper importance to, and wider implications for,
equality jurisprudence.
social problem of sexual harassment, see Yumiko Ehara, 'Sekushuaru harasumento no shakai mondaika'
wa nani o shite iru koto ni naru no ka [Highlighting Sexual Harassment as a Social Problem], in
SEKUSHUARITI [SEXUALITY] 105 (Teruko Inoue et al. eds., 1995).
14 For instance, the Japanese model of relational equality
has parallels to the Western gender-blind
approach to equality. See infra parts i, IV(A).
15 For instance, the Western gender-blind and gender-kind
approaches require some degree of
comparison between men and women---the gender blind approaches mandates that differences between the
sexes should be ignored; the gender-kind approach insists that the differences between the sexes should be
recognized and taken into account. See infra part II. By contrast, the Japanese model of inherent equality
involves no comparison betwen the sexes since, according to the model, equality must inhere in all
individuals. See infra parts II, Il1(B).
16 Importantly,
since the principle of sexual equality has been a tool in
pursuing legal theories on
sexual harassment---rather than a discrete topic of study-these Japanese models of sexual equality are not
explicitly stated by the academics or the judges. Rather, they are indirectly employed as part of the texture
of their arguments. See discussion supra note I1. Therefore, the terms relational, inherent and
quantifiable are meant to identify these different implied visions of equality; they are the author's own
terms.17
See discussion supra note 16.
18
See discussion supra note 16.
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B.

Japanesevs. Western Notions of Equality

These different Japanese models of sexual equality have particularly19
important implications for feminist scholarship. Many feminist scholars

have noted the dangers of gender essentialism-"the notion that a unitary,
"essential" women's experience can be isolated and described
independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other realities of
experience."20

As Harris points out, this tendency toward gender

essentialism denies multiplicity of experiences and silences voices not
within the "norm." 21 Harris argues that the "norm" is that of the white
woman. 22 Perhaps, more accurately, it is that of the white, Western woman.

For one "reality of experience" largely ignored 23 in Western feminist
writings is culture.

Specifically, feminist dialogue on the jurisprudence of equality has
been taking place almost exclusively within a Western socio-political and
cultural framework. This is particularly evident in the way feminist
theorists

have

conceived their theories by endorsing, rebutting or

developing the arguments and views of other mainly Western feminists. 24 It
is also apparent in their choice of statutes, case law, and other legal
materials

from

predominantly

Western

legal

traditions-especially

American and Canadian-as points of reference for their theories." On the
19

E.g., Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990); Drucilla Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine, 75 CORNELL L.
REV. 644 (1990); Elizabeth V. Spelman, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT (1988); Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HAR. L. REV. 829 (1990).
20 Harris,
supra note 19, at 585.
21
Harris, supra note 19, at 615.
22 Harris,
supra note 19, at 615.
23 This is changing.
Feminists are beginning to explore the experiences and
voices of women from
Eastern cultures. See, e.g., WOMEN OF JAPAN AND KOREA (Joyce Gelb & Marian Lief Palley eds., 1994).
24 Harris
herself does this by criticizing the works of Catharine MacKinnon
and Robin West, both
American feminists, to highlight the extent of gender essentialism in feminist scholarship. Harris, supra
note 19, at 585. See also Titia Loenen, Comparative Legal Feminist Scholarship and the Importance of a
Contextual Approach to Concepts and Strategies: The Case of the Equality Debate, 3 FEMINIST LEGAL
STUD. 71 (1995) (comparing U.S. and European/Dutch approaches to equality).
25 E.g.,
Diana Marjury, Strategizing in Equality, in AT THE BOUNDARIES
OF LAW: FEMINISM AND
LEGAL THEORY 320, 325-7 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991)
(discussing the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). Loenen, supra note 24 (discussing American
and Dutch statutes and cases).
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other hand, literature in English on equality from non-Western perspectives
in sadly lacking. This has unduly limited equality discourse.
My purpose in this article is to expand the parameters of feminist
dialogue on equality by introducing some non-Western perspectives on
equality. In particular, my goal is to focus on Japanese contributions to the
jurisprudence of equality. This jurisprudence has blossomed, especially
recently, as both academics and the courts have attempted to define the
nature of sexual equality to determine whether or not there is an unwritten
Japanese law which prohibits sexual harassment. My hope is that by
presenting some of these contributions, equality discourse can take place in
a broader context-a context that does not ignore different historical,
cultural, political, ideological and legal experiences. After all, equality is an
international concern-most legal communities promise equal ustice for all
but do not delineate what is involved in the notion of equality. Hopefully,
these contributions will encourage feminist theorists to explore new
dimensions and depths to equality so that it can be used more effectively as
a concept "to advance women's interests, identify and recognize violations
of their rights and lead to effective remedies." 27 As Marjury powerfully
explains,
It is vital that women continue to theorize about the
meaning of equality... ; that women continue to expose and
denounce their oppression; that feminists continue to question
women's participation in the legal process and raise the specter
of cooptation; that women continue to struggle to be heard
within male discourse. Far from being seen as mutually
exclusive, these strategies must be recognized as mutually
supportive. Possibly in this way, through feminist process and
methodology, women will be able to operationalize equality.
We will not be merely defining equality through legal analysis
and theory making; we will be trying to improve women's
28
lived realities.

26 Mary Gaudron, J., Towards a Jurisprudence of Equality, address
to the Bar Readers' Course,
Brisbane, July 20, 1994.

27

Kathleen E. Mahoney, International Strategies to Implement Equality Rights for Women:
Overcoming Gender Bias in the Courts, 1993 AUsTL. FEMINIST L.J. 115, 120.
28 Marjury, supra note 25, at 337.

JULY 1996

SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN JAPAN

To accommodate these more general hopes, I do not intend to
"debate ' 29 or advance a particular view on which is the better theory.
Rather, my objective is to provide insights into Japanese constructs of
equality in order to share information and further knowledge on this area of
jurisprudence as part of a wider process of consciousness-raising.
II.

WESTERN MODELS OF SEXUAL EQUALITY

Equality is a slippery notion. Despite its omnipresence in political
and legal debate, equality is "hard to describe, even more difficult to
define." 30 It is, as Justice Gaudron 31 laments; "an infuriatingly elusive
concept. 32 This frustration with the indeterminacy of equality, however,
has not deterred Western theorists, ranging from liberal egalitarians to
feminists, from grappling with the concept in an effort to give it some
concrete content. Their work has resulted in a veritable rainbow of
approaches to defining equality.
This diversity of definitions is particularly apparent in feminist theory
generally and feminist jurisprudence specifically. Feminists have applied
many different lenses in their attempts to theorize on the essence of
equality. Some feminist theorists, for example, have adopted a genderblind33 approach. Borrowing elements from the liberal egalitarian
3
tradition, 4 these theorists argue that equality refers to identical treatment. 5
With the ideal that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
29 Marjury argues that "debating" is male and involves point scoring at an opponent's
expense rather
than shedding light on a topic under discussion; sharing information, she submits, is "female" and more
constructive to enhancing knowledge and developing new ideas. Id.
at 320-21.
30 Gaudron,
J., supra note 26.

31 Justice Mary Gaudron is the first-and, as of this writing,
the only-female justice sitting on the
High 32
Court of Australia.
Gaudron, J.,
supra note 26.

33

Sheehy refers to this as the symmetrical approach to equality. Elizabeth A. Sheeby, Personal
Autonomy and the Civil Law: Emerging Issues for Women, in THE HIDDEN GENDER OF LAW 3-4 (Regina
Graycar & Jenny Morgan eds., 1990). Sohrab calls this the equal treatment model. Julia Adiba Sohrab,
Avoiding the 'Exquisite Trap': A CriticalLook at the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate in Law,
I FEMINIST LEG. ST. 141, 142 (1993).
34 See, e.g., Gareth Evans, Benign Discriminationand the
Right to Equality, 6 FED. L. REV. 26, 36-

42(1974).
Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis:Some Reflections
on Culture, Courts and Feminism, 7
WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 175 (1982).
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rights, 0,6 this theory calls for "the elimination of legal or other distinctions
between the sexes and
promotes gender-neutral, strictly identical treatment
37
of men and women."

Others, however, have placed twists on this strict egalitarian approach
and argue in favor of a gender-kind38 approach. Thus, certain theorists
maintain that substantive equality demands that women's special needs in
relation to their actual and immutable biological differences must be taken
into account to prevent disadvantage vis-A-vis men. 39 Others develop this
further by insisting that equality must accommodate more fully the myriad
differences between men and women: the function of equality, according to
this approach,
is to uphold
and respect the specificities of sexuality. A more
•
40
expansive argument holds that equality must not only accommodate but
also accept gender differences; equality, in short, must ensure "the equal
validity of men's and women's lives" 41 and guarantee that "gender
differences, perceived or actual, [are] costless relative to each other, so that
anyone may follow a male, female or androgynous lifestyle according to
their natural inclination or choice without being punished
for following a
42
female lifestyle or rewarded for following a male one."
43
A third approach is the power re-assign
approach. This advocates
that power and advantages are biased in favor of men and, accordingly,
equality requires the reversal of subordination of women by re-assigning
benefits. These three general approaches, however, represent but a slice of
the cake of Western feminist jurisprudence on equality-and, what is more,
there are numerous variations within each of these approaches.

36 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
at 71, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
37 Sheehy,
supra note 33, at 3.
38 Sheehy

refers to this as an asymmetrical approach to equality. Sheehy, supra
note 33, at 4.

Sohrab calls this the special treatment model. Sohrab, supra note 33, at 142.
39 See
generally., Ann C. Scales, The Emergence ofFeministJurisprudence:
An Essay, 95 YALE L.J.
137341986). ELIZABETH WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (1980).
Christine A. Littleton, ReconstructingSexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REv.
1279 (1987).
41 Id.

at 1313.

42 Id.
at 1297.
43 Sheehy calls

this the subordination approach. Sheehy, supra note 33, at 4. See also
CATHERINE

A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 215-34 (1989).
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WHY SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN JAPAN?

In Japan, the most recent44-and most dynamic 45-- developments in
theories on sexual equality have occurred against the backdrop of Japan's

emerging law on sexual harassment. It is for this reason that I analyze
Japanese contributions to the jurisprudence of sexual equality by focusing
on the law against sexual harassment.
46..7
48
Unlike Australia,4 6 the United States,4 7 and other jurisdictions,

Japan does not have a statute specifically prohibiting acts of sexual
harassment. Ueno argues that this reflects the lack of awareness on the part
of the Japanese people of the nature of sexual harassment as a social
problem. 49 This, she suggests, is partially due to the fact that a Japanese
word for "sexual harassment" (sekushuaru harasumento,5 ° commonly
abbreviated as "seku hara") did not become part of commonly accepted
44

Since the 1960s, the courts have decided a series of cases striking down
discrimination against
women in such diverse areas as wage differentials, hiring procedures, promotion opportunities and
retirement practices. See supra note 2 and references cited therein. The sexual harassment cases
"represent[] the latest judicial development in ensuring equitable treatment for women in the workplace."
Wolff supranote 6, at 74.
5 Paradoxically, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Law No. 113 of June
16, 1972, which
came into force on April 1, 1986, has slowed down the judicial impetus in upholding equal treatment for
women in the workplace. For instance, at the date of writing, no case has been brought before the courts
on the basis of the Act. Kamiya suggests that this is mostly because the Act does not provide for legally
enforceable rights. Masako Kamiya, A Decade ofthe Equal Employment Opportunity Act in Japan: Has It

ChangedSociety?, 25 LAW INJAPAN 40, 60 (1995). The sexual harassment litigation, however, is bringing
the courts back into the field of women's rights and reinvigorating academic interest in the topic of sexual
equalit. See infra discussion part Ili.
46 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) secs.
28A-L.
47 Strictly speaking,
the United States does not have an enactment specifically prohibiting acts of
sexual harassment. However, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does include a general prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(lXa) (1996). In 1986, the Supreme Court
held that sexual harassment can constitute discrimination on the basis of sex and is therefore violative of
Title VII. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).

48

E.g., New Zealand has the Human Rights Act (NZ) sec. 62 and the Employment Contracts Act
(NZ) secs. 26, 29.
Mamiko Ueno, Introduction to Part 11:Sei b6ryoku
[Sexual Violence], in SEKUSHUARITI

[SEXUALITY], supra note 13, at 104. Ueno maintains that the Japanese feminist movement has been
instrumental in 'problematizing' sexual harassment-that is, bringing the issue into the public
consciousness. Id.See also Ehara, supra note 13.
50 Sometimes,
the word is rendered 'sekusharu harasumento.' See, e.g.,
Yoshiharu Moronaga,
Sekusharu harasumento [Sexual Harassment], JuRisuTo, Dec. 15, 1990, at 10. The neologism became so

popular that it won a gold award for Best New Word, 1989. Mamiko Ueno, Sekushuaru harasumentokara
kojin no jiritsu o kangaeru [Considering the Independence of the Individual in Light of Sexual
Harassment], HOGAKU SEMNA, May 1990, at 56.
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language use until 1989. 51 Accordingly, sexual harassment remains a
relatively foreign concept to most Japanese people.52 Even in academic
circles, sexual harassment was only introduced as a topic of academic
53
interest in 1983.

Interest in the problem of sexual harassment surged, however, in
198954 when the first sexual harassment case was filed in the Fukuoka
District Court. Newspapers 55 and5popular magazines 56 carried numerous
articles and commissioned surveys on sexual harassment. Some surveys
revealed that as many as six out of ten working women had been sexually
harassed during the course of their working lives. 58 Books proliferated:
"[i]n 1990 alone some ten separate books on sexual harassment appeared,
including 'guides' for male coworkers that ranged from sensitization and
consciousness-raising strategies to more basic 'how not to' and 'how not to
get caught' guidebooks." 5
There was even a prime-time made-for-

television movie in which6 the female character encounters sexual
harassment in the workplace. 0
This popular interest spurred feminist lawyers6 1 and labor law
specialists,62 to probe the problem of sexual harassment and analyze possible
legal remedies. Law journals 63 filled quickly with their analyses; some
51

Ueno, supra note 50, at 56.
52 Akira Okuyama, shokuba ni okeru sekushuaru harasumento-nichibei
ry6koku ni miru saikin no
jittai [Sexual Harassment in the Workplace-Recent Trends in the United States and Japan], HORiTSU NO
HIROBA, June 1990, at 33, 38.
53 Tatsuki Akimoto, Amerika ni miru sukushuaru harasumento
[Sexual Harassment in the United
States aR6D HO6RTSu JuNP6, Nov. 1990, at 22.
YOKO NAKASHITA ET AL., SEKUSHUARU HARASUMENTO [SEXUAL HARASSMENT] i (1987).
55 Patterson,
supra note 12, at 220.
56 NAKASHITA
ET AL., supranote 54, at 7-8.
57 NAKASHITA ET AL., supra note 54, at 7-20 (summarizing the results of many of the surveys).
58 NAKASHITA ET AL., supra note 54, at 17 (summarizing the results of a survey
commissioned by
the maazine Nikkei Uman [Nikkei Woman]).
Sandra Buckley, A Short History of the Feminist Movement in Japan,
in WOMEN OF JAPAN AND
KOREA supranote 23, at 177.
Id
61 See
discussion supra note
3.
62 See
discussion supra note
3.
63 In 1990 alone, the following legal articles were published:
Akio Chiba, Sekushuaru harasumento
a kangaeru [Reflecting on Sexual Harassment], 41 RODO HOGAKU KENKYO KAIH6, 1 (1990); Toshiaki
Hasegawa, Kawaru by6d6kanto sekushuaru harasumento [Sexual HarassmentandShifting Perspectiveson
Equality], HOGAKU SEMINA, May 1990, at 56; Hayashi, supra note 3; Masaomi Kaneko et al., Sekushuaru
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major legal periodicals even published special editions dedicated to the
theme of sexual harassment.6 Faced with no explicit law outlawing sexual:
harassment, the academics typically argued that the practice of sexual
harassment, as a form of sex discrimination, offends a fundamental
principle in the Japanese law of sexual equality. 65 In pursuing this
sexual harassment
argument, the academics invariably defined
unsolicited and
as
unwarranted,
international
definitions
consistently with
unreciprocated attention of a sexual nature, which either is accompanied by
threats or promises of benefits, or creates a hostile working environment.
Since such behavior is patent discrimination against women and thereby
contravenes the principle underlying the legal system of sexual equality,
Japanese law, they concluded, carries an inherent prohibition against acts of
sexual harassment.
The courts' 68 responses to the problem of sexual harassment have
been more circumspect.
Judgments have see-sawed-from decisions
•• 69
cautiously recognizing

the illegality of sexual harassment to reactionary
responses, including the dismissal
of the complainant's suit for evidentiary

harasument no hdritsu mondai [Sexual Harassment as a Legal Issue], JURISUTO, June 1, 1990, at 12;
Kiyoko Kinj6, Sekushuaru harasumento to danjo koy6 kikai kint6hd, JuRIsuTO, June 1, 1990, at 37;
Yoshiharu Moronaga, Sekusharu harasumento to hdteki kyuisai [Legal Relieffor Sexual Harassment],
JURISUTO, June 1, 1990, at 165; Akira Okuyama, Sekushuaru harasumento to ihdsei handan no kijun
[Sexual Harassment and the Criteria for Determining its Illegality], JURISUTO, June 1, 1990, at 51;
Okuyama, supra note 52; Akira Okuyama, Hdritsu mondai toshite no sekushuaru harasumento [Sexual
Harassment as a Legal Problem] H6GAKU SEMINA, Mar. 1990, at 49 [hereinafter, HIritsu mondai1;
Higashiko Sogabe, Shokuba ni okeru seiteki iyagarase no fittai to shomondai [Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: The Facts and the Issues], JIY(t TO SEIGI, June 1990, at 52; Shizuko Sugii, Shinkoku najinken
shingai-sekushuaru harasumento [Sexual Harassment: A Serious Infringement ofHuman Rights], 246 HO
TO MINSHUSHUGI 40 (1990); Shizuko Sugii, Sekushuaru harasumento no hdteki kent6 [A Legal Analysis of
Sexual Harassment], 81 HO NO SHIHAI 32 (1990); Ueno, supra note 50.
64 RODO HORITSU JuNPO, a leading journal on labor law issues, published a special edition on sexual
harassment in 1989 (issue no. 1228); in 1990, JuRISUTO, a general law journal, followed by publishing its
own s6ecial issue (issue no. 956).
E.g., Kinj6, supra note 63, at 39 (1990); Moronaga, supra note 50, at 10; Hideki
Nagata,
Sekusharu Harasumento ni Yoru Seisabetsu [Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination], HOGAKU SEMINA,
July 121992, at 130.
E.g., Hayashi, supra note 3, at 43-44; Kaneko, supra note 3, at 5; Moronaga, supra note 50, at 11.
67 See,
e.g., the Guidelines on sexual harassment issued by the Equal Emplyment
Opportunity
Commission in 1980. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1996). See also Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) sec. 28A
(Austl..
N. See discussion supra notes I
and 4.
69
E.g., the court in the Fukuoka Sexual Harassment Case, in holding that the plaintiff was
entitled to
relief for verbal acts of sexual harassment, did not even mention the word 'sexual harassment' in the text of
the judgment. Fukuoka Sexual Harassment Case, supra note 1.
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reasons 70 or the upholding of the defendant's counter-claims. 71 Most
recently, the courts have re-affirmed the unlawfulness of sexual
harassment. 72 However, as a general trend, the courts have accepted the
basic tenor of the scholars' arguments, recognizing that acts of sexual
73
harassment may constitute a tort under Article 709 of the Civil Code.
Currently, sexual harassment litigation 74 has not progressed beyond the
District Court level. 7 5 Despite their lack of precedential value, 7 6 however,
these lower court decisions represent early Japanese judicial attempts to
grapple with the problem of sexual harassment and to dress it in its proper
legal clothing. More importantly, the sexual harassment decisions-and the
scholarly works discussing sexual harassment-have relied upon different
models of sexual equality as part of their reasoning and analysis. The next
part describes these models and the legal settings in which they were etched.

70

Yokohama Sexual
Harassment Case, supra note 4.
7'
Tokyo Sexual Harassment Case, supra note 4.
72
Osaka Sexual Harassment Case, supra note I.
See especially Shizuoka Sexual Harassment Case, supra note I; Fukuoka Sexual Harassment
Case, supra note 1; Kanazawa Sexual Harassment Case, supra note 4; and Osaka Sexual Harassment
Case, supra note 1.
74 The common perception is that the Japanese rarely
bring their disputes to court. Foote, supra note
10, at 636. Although some have claimed that this is due to a peculiarly Japanese cultural aversion to
litigation, Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN: THE
LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41 (Arthur von Mehren ed., 1963), other scholars point to
institutional barriers in bringing suit in Japan, such as high court costs, court delays and lack of enforcment
procedures, John 0. Haley, The Myth ofthe Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. OF JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978). There
are also barriers specific to bringing sexual harassment suits. First, as the Tokyo Sexual Harassment,supra
note 4, and Yokohama Sexual Harassment Cases, supra note 4, illustrate, allegations of sexual harassment
are difficult to prove. Second, there is the social disapprobation women encounter when instituting sexual
harassment suits. Patterson, supra note 12, at 215.
However, sexual harassment litigation is on the increase. At the end of 1995, there were about twenty
cases pending in Japanese courts. Kotoba no Seku Hara ni mo Mesu [Court Probes Verbal Sexual
Harassment], NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Nov. 27, 1995, at 11.
75 The defendant has appealed the decision
in the Osaka Sexual Harassment Case, supra
note 1,
therebY6 opening up the possibility of a future High Court decision on sexual harassment.
Although there is no formal doctrine of precedent in Japan,
courts, as a matter of practice, tend to
respect prior decisions. See TANAKA, supra note 3, at 157-58.
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IV.

JAPANESE MODELS OF SEXUAL EQUALITY

A.

RelationalEquality

The first model of equality is relational equality. This model holds
that equality is tested by determining whether women are being treated in
the same way as men. Thus, equality is a relative exercise, involving a
comparison of the treatment of women to that received by men and
requiring that both sexes are meted out the same burdens and preferences.
There is to be no arbitrary differentiation based on sex. This model,
however, implicitly recognizes that the standard of comparison is male
(women are to be treated the same as men) rather than female (men are to be
treated the same as women) or androgynous (men and women are to be
treated according to the same, abstract, asexual criteria). The rationale for
this model appears to be pluralism-a relativistic democratic ideal which
"denie[s] absolute truths, remain[s] institutionally flexible and critical,
value[s] diversity,
and [draws] strength from innumerable competing
78
subgroups."
As the most widely supported model on equality by Japanese
academics, this model relies on implanting elements of foreign lawespecially American influences-and international law into the domestic
79
Japanese legal environment. Architects of this model such as Okuyama,
81
82
84
Fukushima,
Sogabe,83 ofand
Nakagawa,
all
commence theirHayashi,
argumentsMoronaga,
with a consideration
Chapter
VII of the

77

My own term. See notes 16 and accompanying text.
78 E. PURCELL,

THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 211 (1973), quoted
in Nancy S. Ehrenreich,
Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology ofReasonableness in Sexual HarassmentLaw, 99 Yale

L.J. 1177,
1188 (1990).
79 See
Okuyama, supranote 63. Okuyama is a professor at Seij6 University.
80 See
Fukushima, supra note 3. Fukushima is a Japanese attorney. See supra note
3.
81 See
Hayashi, supranote 3.
82
See Moronaga, supra note 50. Yoshiharu Moronaga is a Japanese attorney, member of the Daini
T6ky6 Bengoshikai [Second Tokyo Bar Association] and Deputy Chairperson of the Rysei no By6d6 ni
Kansuru linkai [Committee for the Equality of the Sexes].
83 See Sogabe, supra note 63. Higashiko Sogabe is a Japanese attorney and member
of the Daini
T6kyd Bengoshikai [Second Tokyo Bar Association].
84See Jun Nakagawa, Sekusharu harasumento [Sexual Harassment], 45(6)
HORITSU NO HIROBA 54

(1992). Nakagawa is professor emeritus at Hiroshima University.
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American Civil Right Act,85 as further defined in the E ual Employment
Opportunity Commission's Guidelines issued in 1980, and the basic
provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women.87 Unaminously, they interpret
American and international law as proscribing any conduct in which women
are treated differently from men. Sexual harassment, which subjects women
to a different and more adverse working environment and working
conditions, is a classic instance of such arbitrary differential treatment.
Japanese writers then translate this prevailing international and
American construct of equality as identical treatment in domestic legal
terms. For example, they argue that sexual harassment would constitute a
tort since, as a form of sex discrimination, it is a "juristic act" which offends
"public policy and good morals" under article 70 of the Civil Code.
They
further maintain that sexual harassment, although not specifically covered in
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, would come within its objects of
"securing equal opportunity and equality of treatment of women in the work
force in line with the principle of equality guaranteed by the Japanese
Constitution.
Moreover, a duty on employers under the Labor Standards
and Welfare Act to provide a "safe working environment for all
employees"8 9 would mean that companies would have to implement active
policies to combat sexual harassment since it subjects women to an adverse
working environment.
This popular thesis, however, has been overwhelmingly rejected by
the courts.
The courts, for example, have dismissed international and
91
foreign legal trends as irrelevant to the Japanese legal experience.
85
86

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (1996).
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1996).

87

18 December 1979, 34 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 21) (A/34/46) at 193, UN Doc. AIRES/34/180
(entry into force September 3, 1981).
Koy6 no bunya ni okeru danjo no kint6 na kikai oyobi
taigu no kakuho tojoshi r6d6shanofukushi
no z6shin ni kansuru h6ritsu [An Act to Promote the Welfare of Female Workers by Providing for Equality

of Opportunity and Treatment in Employment for Women], § I (Law No. 45 of 1985).
R6d6 kiunh6 [Labor Standards and Welfare Act), § 3 (Law No. 47 of 1949).
90 See
supra notes I and 4.

91 The Fukuoka District Court, for example, refused to consider
foreign legal developments and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women despite an express
invitation to do so by the plaintiff in her Statement of Claim. See Fukuoka Sexual Harassment Case, supra
note 6. The plaintiff's Statement of Claim is reproduced in the Fukuoka Sexual Harassment Case, supra
note 6, at 54.
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Moreover, they reject the significance of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act since it does not provide actionable claims nor enforceable
civil remedies for women who have suffered discrimination. The act merely
requires employers to "strive" to stamp out discriminatory practices in
recruitment, hiring, job assignment, promotion, training, employee benefits
and retirement and dismissal policies; there are no precisely defined
standards of conduct and no penalties for breaches of the duty to provide
equal treatment to women. 92 The courts have also chosen not to rely on the
"public policy and good morals" provision of the Civil Code to outlaw.
sexual harassment, even though it has been used in a string of cases in the
1970s and 1980s to stamp out other discriminatory practices. 93 Even the
duty to provide a safe working environment has been given a different
interpretation than that advanced by the academics. 94 By stripping the
popular academic argument of its essential planks in this way, the courts
have thereby rejected the relational theory of equality.
Inherent Equality

B.

The second main Japanese model is the direct. opposite of the first.
The non-relational or inherent9 5 model of equality considers that equality is
not a comparative exercise involving a consideration of whether or not the
treatment of women stands on the same level as the treatment of men;
rather, equality subsists inherently-it exists when both men and women are
free to express their personhood, including their sexuality, without
restriction. Under this model, sexual harassment denies women full
equality because it dehumanizes and undervalues them as human beings,
subjecting them either to unwelcome sexual advances or to a malevolent
working environment. It therefore limits their ability to participate freely in
society generally and in the work force specifically.
92

For an overview of Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity Act, see Lorraine Parkinson,
Note,

Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity Law: An Alternative Approach to Social Change, 89 COLUM. L.

assessment, see Kamiya, supra note 2.
REV. 604
93 (1989). For a more critical

See supranote 2.
94 The judgment in the Fukuoka Sexual Harassment Case, for example, imposes a
stronger duty on

employers than merely ensuring a "safe" workplace; they must ensure that the work environment is also
"hospitable."

See Fukuoka Sexual Harassment Case,supra note 6, at 64.

My own term. See note 16 and accompanying text.
96 Ueno, supra note 50, at 56.
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Ueno 97 is the most forceful advocate of this model. Although she
makes fleeting reference to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women as recognizing "on an international level
... the inherent principle that women... are of equal worth as men," 98
Ueno relies most heavily on Japanese constitutional law to support her
theory. Ueno's thesis is that article 14 of the Japanese constitution, which
guarantees sexual equality, should be interpreted in light of article 13 which
provides that "all people shall be respected as individuals ...and their right
to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall . . .be the supreme
consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs."
Ueno argues that the guarantee of sexual equality, when read in
conjunction with article 14, means that women have the right to respect as
free and independent individuals. This not only includes the right to social,
political,
economic
and
cultural
freedoms
but also sexual
self-determination. 99 These constitutional abstract rights, Ueno writes, are
given concrete legal force by virtue of article 70 of the Civil Code which
proscribes juristic acts which are contrary to good morals and public policy.
Thus, she concludes, any act which violates this construction of the
constitutional guarantee of sexual equality-including acts of sexual
harassment-is actionable under civil law.
A similar view of sexual equality, albeit with a slightly different legal
rationale, was advanced by the Fukuoka District Court in the Fukuoka
Sexual Harassment Case.1° ° This case concerned acts of verbal sexual
harassment perpetrated by the defendant, the Editor-in-Chief at a publishing
house, against the plaintiff editorial assistant. The acts of sexual harassment
consisted of spreading rumors and making defamatory comments about the
plaintiffs private sexual behavior to other employees, executive officers
and even the company's business clients. The comments ranged from
allegations that the plaintiff was, at various times, having affairs with a
senior officer of the company, an employee cover designer, two staff
reporters and a business client, to assertions that the plaintiff had
uncontrollable sexual urges and was a mere pleasure seeker who led a
pornographic lifestyle. When management refused to intervene despite the
97

Ueno, supra note 50,at 56.
Ueno, supra note 50, at 57.
99 Ueno, supra note 50, at 58.
10Fukuoka Sexual Harassment Case, supra note I.
98
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plaintiffs repeated requests, the plaintiff reluctantly resigned from the
company and instituted a civil suit against both the defendant and the
defendant publishing house. The court found for the plaintiff, holding that
sexual equality was not only a constitutional guarantee but a legal principle
permeating the entire Japanese legal system. The court reasoned that,
consistent with this principle of sexual equality, certain "personal rights"-such as the right to respect, the right to a reputation both as an individual
and as a woman, and the right to work in a hospitable working
environment-inhere in all women. Violations of these rights could amount
to an "unlawful act" within the meaning of article 709 of the Civil Code and
thereby be actionable as a tort:
The natural conclusion is that the defendant liable under
article 709 of the Civil Code for unlawful acts. This is so on
the grounds that he created an inhospitable working
environment for the plaintiff as a result of his statements
directed to the plaintiff and other persons associated with the
business of the defendant company on occasions related to the
business of the defendant company (whether at the workplace
itself or outside it) casting aspersionson the plaintiffs private
sex life and her sexual inclinations ....
Such acts by the defendant, viewed as a whole, amount
to, first, acts calculated to blacken the estimation by others of
the plaintiff as a working woman by both alluding to her
private life-and especially her personal relationships-and
criticizing her inclinations as if they were uncontrollable in
front of persons associated with the defendant company at the
actual workplace ... ; and, second, acts calculated to blacken
the estimation by others of the plaintiff by spreading rumors
about the plaintiff s relationships .... These two acts.. . were
both aimed at undermining the estimation by others of the
plaintiff as a working woman, and ultimately forced her to
resign herposition ....
Without a doubt, all this was against
the wishes of the defendant and injured her reputation as well
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as her other personal rights. These acts also caused 0the
working environment to deteriorate....(emphasis added).' '
The same result was achieved in the most recent sexual harassment
case, the Osaka Sexual Harassment Case.102 In this case, the President of a
medium-sized freight company questioned a newly-recruited eighteen year
old female employee about her virginity and the sexual behavior of students
at her high school. The President remarked how he "wanted" the plaintiff
and that he would bring some money to work the next day so they could
spend a night at a hotel. The plaintiff suffered physical symptoms as a
result of this verbal harassment and was unable to return to work. She
eventually resigned after less than four months working at the company.
Judge Tsuji held that the defendant President was liable for unlawful acts of
sexual harassment. This was on the basis that the defendant engaged in a
deliberate campaign to disorient the plaintiff with sexually suggestive words
and actions. The harassment in question, concluded the judge, was clearly
against the plaintiffs will, violated her right "to be respected as a
14
woman," ' 103 and subjected her to a malevolent working environment. 0
C.

QuantifiableEquality

The third Japanese model of equality is quantiable'0 5 equality. This
model holds that equality can be quantified by reference to certain
identifiable units of measurement. According to this construct, if males
possess the same number of units as women, then sexual equality has been
achieved. Unlike the relational equality which compares standards of
treatment of women in relation to men, the quantifiable model is a
balancing exercise which necessitates that the two sides of the scales--one
with the male bundle of units, the other with the female bundle of units-is
in perfect equilibrium. Accordingly, there is no male standard against
which female equality is determined; all that is required is that the units of

101
102
103
104
l05

Fukuoka Sexual Harassment Case, supra
note 6, at 75.
Osaka Sexual Harassment Case, supra note I.
Osaka Sexual Harassment Case, supra note 1, at 205.
Osaka Sexual Harassment Case, supra note 1, at 205.
My own term. See note 16 and accompanying text.
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*measurement on either side balance in weight. In short, this is a model of
equality as equilibrium.
Quantifiable equality has three strands. The strands differ depending
on the unit of measurement which is adopted in order to determine the state
of equilibrium. Thus, the first strand regards power as the operative unit of
measurement; the second strand deems economic utiles as the appropriate
unit of measurement; and the third-and perhaps most unusual--employs a
cultural unit of good manners.
1.

Power Strand of QuantifiableEquality

The power strand of quantifiable equality holds that equality is
measured by reference to the equivalence of social advantages and
preferences enjoyed by both sexes. Sexual harassment, which amounts to
the social and economic oppression of women either by creating a hostile or
uncomfortable working environment or by forcing women to submit to
unfavorable conditions in order to maintain their jobs or seek promotion
opportunities, is therefore sex discrimination because the male oppressor
has assumed a dominating power advantage over the subordinated female
victim.
This construction, at first glance, seems very similar to the
power-assign approach in Western feminist jurisprudence, especially
MacKinnon's subordination principle.'0 6 It is tempting to assume,
therefore, that Japanese academics have adopted and adapted this model to
their own domestic law. The assumption, however, is misplaced. Although
most Japanese academics writing on sexual harassment in Japan rely
heavily on American case law and the works of American scholars,
especially MacKinnon, as a launching pad for developing their own ideas
and theories, 10 7 no Japanese academic has adopted wholesale, or even in
part, the power-assign approach.
Rather, the power strand of quantifiable equality is a purely judicial
construct. It was first advanced, as a matter of substantive law, in the
Shizuoka Sexual Harassment Case.l10 In this case, the plaintiff was a
106
107

MacKinnon, supra note 43.

E.g., Kaneko, Sekushuaru harasumento no h6ritsu mondai [Sexual Harassment
as a Legal
Issue], supra note 3; Moronaga, supra note 50; Nagata, supra note 65; Okuyama, supra note 52; and
Sogabe, supra note 63.
Supra note
1.
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female hotel employee and the defendant was Chief of Accounts and the
plaintiffs immediate superior. The defendant subjected the plaintiff to
sustained acts of sexual harassment, including touching her while
demanding that she go with him to a motel so he could "see her naked" and
kissing her repeatedly against her will. The plaintiff sued the defendant for
both the loss of her job (she was forced to resign when rumors spread
around the hotel about her presumed affair with the defendant) and for
non-pecuniary losses including psychological anguish, insomnia and loss of
appetite. Judge Akimoto of the Shizuoka District Court held that the
"nature, mode, method and means" 10 9 of the defendant's behavior
constituted an "unlawful act" within the meaning of article 709 of the Civil
Code. It was unlawful, declared Judge Akimoto, because the defendant had
oppressed and disadvantaged the plaintiff by "treating her as a mere object
of pleasure, a plaything, rather than as an individual with a human
character."110
A similar reasoning process was applied in the Fukuoka Sexual
Harassment Case,I ' but this time as a matter of procedural law. In
determining whether the plaintiff editor had suffered any loss, the court
noted that the plaintiff had also contributed to the uneasy working
relationship between herself and the defendant Editor-in-Chief.
Nevertheless, the court held that the defendant was more culpable because
the balance of power between himself and the defendant was tipped firmly
in the defendant's favor. The court used the evidentiary technique of
judicial notice to find that the plaintiff, as a working woman in Japanese
society, was a member of a traditionally oppressed group in society and
therefore held a lighter stock of power units:
However, the defendant's acts were not necessarily the
only cause for the worsening work environment.
The
plaintiff's attitude, actions and character also contributed to the
stand-off between herself and the defendant. Conscious of her
own abilities and the defendant's irresponsibility, the plaintiff
viewed the defendant as a rival; she also aimed to be the key
player in the defendant company, attempting to place all
109

110

745 HANREI TAIMUZU 238,
239 (1991).

Id

Il Supra note I.
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persons associated with the defendant company (whether inside
or outside) under her influence. In giving judgment, I must
give due regard to these circumstances. In such a situation, it is
inevitable that both parties will engage in injurious conduct and
slander. However, in light of the positionof working women in
modern society and the view of women held by men occupying
managerial positions in companies, I feel compelled in this

case to find that the defendant acted unlawfully by criticizing
the plaintiffs private life as his main means and ends of
resolving their stand-off
and ostracizing the other party
2
(emphasis added)."
2.

Economic Strand of QuantifiableEquality

The economic strand of quantifiable equality holds that equality is
defined in terms of economic consequences. If a particular act or course of
behavior results in a greater economic detriment to one party than to
another, then this constitutes sex discrimination. Applying this reasoning,
the architects of this construct conclude that since sexual harassment has a
more adverse impact on women than men in terms of job security, job
satisfaction and promotion opportunities, it is unlawful discrimination on
the basis of gender.
The proponents of this economic strand of quantifiable equality are
typically Japanese labor law specialists who invoke public policy and labor
legislation to buttress their position. For instance, Yamada points out that
acts of sexual harassment force many women to leave their jobs. 113 If they
resist unwelcome sexual advances, they are denied legitimate promotion,
training and job allocation opportunities. As demonstrated in the Shizuoka
Sexual Harassment Case,"l 4 female victims of sexual harassment can also
suffer psychological trauma, shame, insecurity and, in severe cases,
invasion of bodily integrity and assault. Women are therefore denied the
right to a safe, comfortable and equitable working environment on the same
terms as men. They are accordingly denied certain economic benefits which

112

Supra note 6, at 63-64.
113 Yamada, supra note 63, at 32. Sh6ji Yamada is a professor at Chu6 Gakuin University.
114

Supra note 1.
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men enjoy. As a matter of public policy, therefore, sexual harassment is not
only socially reprehensible but also economically inequitable.
Fukushima, 115 Kinj6,116 Moronaga,"' and Okuyama" l encrust the
public policy arguments with a discussion of Japanese labor law.
Specifically, they refer to two key labor law statutes-the Labor Safety and
Welfare Law 119 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Ac12°-which
together guarantee a safe, secure and equitable working environment for all
employees. Thus, article three of the Labor Safety and Welfare Law
compels employers to provide a safe working environment and to ensure the
maintenance of minimum working conditions; whereas the Equal
Employment Opportunity Law provides generally that employers either
must, or should strive to, achieve equality in pay, hiring, retirement, training
and promotion opportunities. Since sexual harassment threatens the
well-being and the job opportunities of women, they argue, it is contrary to
the spirit and content of Japanese labor law. Labor law, in short, demands
equal distribution of economic utiles between men and women, and this is
threatened by sexual harassment.
3.

Cultural Strandof QuantifiableEquality

The cultural strand of quantifiable equality is given voice by
Hasegawa in her strongly-worded article Danjo koy6 bydd6h6 wa bunka no
seitaikei o hakaisuru [The Equal Employment Law will Destroy Cultural

Ecology].121 Although Hasegawa was chiefly concerned with equal
opportunity in the work place, her comments on sexual equality are equally
applicable to sexual harassment. Hasegawa argues that equitable gender
' 122 In her
relations
achievedroles
through
a country's
"cultural
view, the are
respective
of males
and females
in a ecosystem."
country is "integral
to
115
116

Fukushima, supranote
3.
Kinj6, supra note 63. Kiyoko Kinj6 is an attorney and a professor
at Tsuda Juku University.

117
Moronaga, supranote 50.
!18 Hdritsu
mondai,supra note 63.
119 R6d6 kiunh6 [Labor Standards and Welfare Act], § 3 (Law No. 47 of 1949).
120

The Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Law No. 113
of June 16, 1972.

121 CHUO KORON, May 1984, at 78.

Michiko Hasegawa is an associate professor at Saitama

University (For a translation of her article, see Michiko Hasegawa, Equality of the Sexes Threatens
CulturalEcology, ECONOMIC EYE, June 1984, at 23.).
122 Id at 81.
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and inseparable from" 123 the very fabric of a nation's cultural ecosystem
and should not be interfered with through legal processes. Pressure by
Western countries to change a country's culture, norms and customs, as
demonstrated in articles 2(f), 3 and 5(a) of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 124 represents
Western cultural arrogance, forcing all nations to subscribe to a particular
Western vision of appropriate behavior. Such pressure should be resisted,
she claims, because 25
it threatens the quintessential fabric of the victim state's
ecosystem.'
cultural
Instead of acceding to Western visions of equality, Hasegawa
maintains that gender equilibrium is adequately regulated through the forces
of unspoken culture.126 Although Hasegawa does not specify the nature of
these cultural forces, other cultural anthropologist scholars, both Western
and Japanese, have attempted to describe these autothcaneous cultural traits.
Kawashima, 127 for example, paints Japanese personal relations as
harmonious and consensual where disputes, should they arise, are resolved
by mutual understanding. Parker 128 points to the Japanese preference for
group relationships over individual satisfaction, which leads to personal
129
interdependence, mutual trust and group harmony. Kim and Lawrence
refer to social ideals such as giri (social obligation) and ninj6 (human
compassion), which, they suggest, are effective enough to control human
behavior without the need for legal rules.
Therefore, Hasegawa concludes, good manners, as required by
Japanese culture, will ensure that women and men are treated with equal
respect within the Japanese culture ecosystem. 13
Breaches of cultural
norms and rules will lead to social penalties. The force of Western-inspired
law, therefore, is unnecessary.
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It is submitted, however, that the argument Hasegawa constructs is
problematic for three reasons. These reasons tend to diminish the value of
her argument to feminist discourse on equality. First, Hasegawa proposes a
paternalistic solution (namely, that respect for women can occur through
cultural forces within a patriarchal Confucian society) to a paternalistic
problem (namely, men harassing women purely on the basis of their
gender). Second, her view that culture is strong enough to withstand
anti-social behavior against women does not match social reality, where
recent surveys of the extent of sexual harassment in Japan indicate that
almost sixty percent of women have been sexually harassed in their working
lives. 131 Third, her thesis accords with the nihonjinron tradition 132-which
13 3
maintains that Japan's culture is distinctive and unparalleled in the world.

This theme of cultural uniqueness is now largely discounted as a "vapidly
reiterated" 134 myth.
These problems, however, must not hide the important challenge
Hasegawa poses to feminist theory: how should gender equality be
reconciled with respect for cultural traditions? Hasegawa points to the
dangers of importing foreign political ideals into a cultural environment

with differently nuanced assumptions and values. She suggests that
redefining the interdependence between the sexes by replacing existing
cultural norms with outside rules can, in the Japanese cultural context,
transform male-female relations from one of "harmony and co-operation" to
"competition and antagonism."'

35

Hasegawa's conclusion is that the

integrity of Japan's
cultural identity should be protected against Western36
sponsored ideals.'
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assumptions underpinning her argument-the ostensible uniqueness of the Japanese culture, the
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Of course, Hasegawa's conclusion is not the only possible resolution
to the conflict between equality and culture. An alternative answer would
be to subjugate cultural considerations in order to ingrain a right to equality,
perhaps as part of a vision to "liberally transform"' 137 Japanese society. Or
maybe the solution lies elsewhere-somewhere between the two extremes
of importing wholesale Western values of sexual equality and entrenching
an existing cultural ecosystem. As Hasegawa herself admits, culture is not
immutable. 138 Culture can also ebb and flow with changing times. Thus, if
equality is to be regulated through culture, then arguably through a gradual
process of consciousness-raising and periodical re-evaluation of community
standards, Japan's Confucian culture can manage male-female relationships
according to shifting and constantly-evolving precepts. This process could
convert Japan's closed communitarianism-which, Inoue 139 argues, stifles
the recognition of the rights of those in the community who do
14 not have
power, such as women-into a more open form of communality. 0
At any rate, the cultural strand of quantifiable equality is likely to
prove the most controversial model of equality. This is precisely because of
the push-and-pull involved between the equality ideal and cultural identity.
In my view, the model, as Hasegawaexpresses it, has serious shortcomings.
This does not undermine, however, the overarching significance of the
model-which lies in the way it highlights the tension between equality and
culture.
V.

CONCLUSION

Japanese scholarship into the problem in sexual harassment, which
surged in 1989, has had a spin-off benefit. It has forced both leading

Japanese academics and the courts to develop theories on the nature of
sexual equality in order to develop a possible legal response to the problem.
(In the cultural strand of quantifiable equality, the conclusion, however, was
that a legal response was not necessary as cultural forces are sufficient to
regulate appropriate standards of conduct.).
'37
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For each model of equality, a different legal basis served as
inspiration. Thus, proponents of the relational model of equality cite
international and foreign legal trends; the architects of the inherent model
rely on Japanese constitutional law; and advocates of the quantifiable model
find support variously in tort law and evidence (power strand), labor law
and public policy (economic strand) and the Japanese cultural ethos
(cultural strand).
The various Japanese models of equality may prove of interest to
Western feminist theorists in a number of ways. The points of divergence
from and intersections with Western theories on equality should be of
particular interest. For example, it is interesting to note that relational
equality, which is popularly used by Australian and American courts to
outlaw acts of sexual harassment, has not found favor in Japanese courts.
The different methods of legal reasoning behind the equality formulations
may also provide useful source of future study. Why, for example, do
Japanese courts refuse to consider international law as part of the
interpretation of domestic law? And could judicial notice, which played
such an important role in the Fukuoka Sexual Harassment case, be applied
with equal effect by Japan's Western cousins?
Moreover, the interplay of equality theory with other areas of feminist
study-such as rights discourse, culture and adjudication-should provide
yet another fertile source of theoretical development. Thus, the inherent
model of equality relies heavily on "personal rights" for its theoretical
support; the cultural strand of quantifiable equality justifies
non-intervention of the legal process on the basis of the dynamics of
142
14 1
Japanese Confucian culture; and the courts in the Shizuoka, Fukuoka,
and Osaka143 Sexual Harassment cases have played crucial roles, arguably
in an activist capacity, 144 in developing theories of sex equality and sex
discrimination and in upholding a woman's right to be free from sexual
harassment.
My aim in this essay was to broaden the parameter of the debate on
sexual equality. Perhaps I have succeeded only in illustrating that equality
can take on many, diverse forms, even within the limited context of one
141
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country's response (Japan's) to one particular form of sexual discrimination

(sexual harassment). Even so, these Japanese models should be useful to
feminists in developing, improving, re-interpreting or even re-inventing the
essence of equality. After all, as Abella succinctly puts it: "[e]quality is
evolutionary, in process as well
as substance, it is cumulative, it is
145
persistent."
is
it
and
contextual,

145

Rosalie Silberman Abella, The Dynamic Nature of Equality, in EQUALITY
AND JUDICIAL

NEUTRALITY 4 (Sheilah L. Martin & Kathleen E. Mahoney eds., 1987).

